Tuesday, November 10, 2009

HAMP Servicers Start 650,000 Trial Modifications

Posted on the Housing Wire by Jon Prior:

Servicers have started 650,994 three-month trial modifications for borrowers under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) since its launch in March 2009, according to an updated servicer performance report by the US Treasury Department.

Through HAMP, the Treasury allocates capped incentives to participating servicers for the modification of loans on the verge of foreclosure. The Treasury began releasing progress reports after the Obama Administration set a goal of reaching 3m to 4m homeowners over the next three years.

The updated report, which measures performance through October from the Treasury, indicates:

Saxon Mortgage Services continues to lead all services by starting trial modifications for 44% of its 80,477 eligible portfolio of 60-plus day delinquent loans, an increase from 39% from the September report.

Bank of America (BAC: 15.92 +0.95%) started 136,994 trial modifications, the most on a gross volume basis, which is 14% of its eligible portfolio, an increase from 94,918 started through September or 7% of its portfolio. The bank also holds 990,628 eligible loans in its portfolio, the most for any participating servicer.

Other notable performances include: CitiMortgage starting trial modifications for 40% of its 221,916 eligible loans, up from 23% through September and the second highest percentage of the servicers; GMAC starting 35% of its 65,946 eligible loans, the third highest percentage; Wells Fargo (WFC: 28.24 -0.56%) starting 29% of its 323,198 eligible loans, an increase from 11% through September; Litton Loan Servicing starting 12% of its 10,496 in eligible loans, up from 3%.

California leads all states with 134,609 active trial modifications. Florida came in second with 82,614 trial modifications, and Arizona rounded out the top three with 34,424 trial modifications.

According to the latest Troubled Asset Relief Program transaction report, 72 servicers receive more than $27bn in allocated cap incentives.

US Foreclosure Rate Swells to 3.12% in September: LPS

Posted on the Housing Wire by Jon Prior:

The rate of non-current loans, a combination of foreclosures and delinquencies as a percent of active loans, reached 12.49%, a record high in the US, according to a report from Lender Processing Services (LPS: 42.83 +1.32%).

LPS manages loan-level residential mortgage data and performance information from more than 40m loans.

LPS’ Mortgage Monitor report also showed the nation’s September foreclosure rate jumping to 3.12%, a 2.6% increase from the previous month and an 88.9% hike from last year. Florida led the way with 10.4% of loans in foreclosure, and more than 22% of loans reported as non-current.

The total US delinquency rate stands at 9.37%, according to the report, and the number of loans sinking further into delinquent status more than doubled the amount of foreclosure starts. Nearly 33% of foreclosures remain in pre-sale status after 12 months, double the amount from last year. The six-month deterioration ratio rose in the past two months to 300%, meaning that for every loan that improves in status, three more deteriorate further, according to the report.

This large “shadow” inventory of foreclosures and real estate-owned (REO) inventory indicates another onslaught of troubled loans in an already backed-up pipeline, according to the report.

Florida, Nevada and Mississippi lead all states with the most non-current loans. North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming have the fewest non-current loans.

Sunday, November 8, 2009

Putting the MERS Controversies in Perspective

Posted on Calculated Risk:

A great deal has been written in the last year or so about cases in which a court has denied a lender the right to foreclose on a mortgaged house. Lately many of the decisions have involved MERS, an acronym for the nationwide Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. This post focuses on two August decisions in which the courts decided MERS should be able to foreclose, despite vigorous legal efforts by the homeowners.

Bucci vs. Lehman Brothers

This is a trial court decision from Rhode Island. The homeowners stopped making mortgage payments in September of 2008, the lender sent a notice of non-judicial foreclosure sale the following March. After slight delays the foreclosure sale ended up being scheduled in July. So lesson number one from this case is that you can’t necessarily count on staying in your house for years if you stop paying the mortgage. The amount of time to foreclosure will vary a great deal depending on the lender and the state you live in.

The day before the scheduled sale, the homeowners filed a lawsuit to stop it. The homeowners’ primary argument was that the foreclosure was being carried out in the name of MERS, but MERS was not really the owner of the mortgage and note. After a short hearing in July, the court decided that MERS could foreclose. The judge primarily based his decision on the plain language of the mortgage document, which said:
MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property.
The homeowners also argued the lender had not properly designated MERS as a nominee with power to foreclose on the lender’s behalf, because the lender didn’t sign the mortgage. The judge held:
[I]n consideration for Mr. Bucci receiving $249,900, the Buccis granted a mortgage to MERS. If Lehman had not approved of MERS acting as its nominee, Lehman would not have disbursed the loan proceeds to the Buccis.
This is only a trial court decision, but I don’t see anything glaringly wrong with it. It’s pretty typical of the large number of decisions finding that MERS can indeed foreclose on mortgages if it has the paperwork more or less in order. The lawyer representing the homeowners obviously disagrees. He says he has devoted his entire legal practice to challenging MERS, and he has appealed the Bucci decision.

Jackson v. MERS

This is a decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court. Several homeowners facing foreclosure banded together to bring a lawsuit arguing that MERS had not properly recorded its loan assignments under Minnesota law. The case was removed to federal court, but because this precise issue had not been decided by Minnesota state courts, the federal court punted the issue to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the following question:
Where an entity, such as defendant [MERS], serves as mortgagee of record as nominee for a lender and that lender’s successors and assigns and there has been no assignment of the mortgage itself, is an assignment of the ownership of the underlying indebtedness for which the mortgage serves as security an assignment that must be recorded prior to the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure by advertisement under Minn. Stat. ch. 580?
The court ultimately decided that the MERS process did not violate the recording requirements of Minnesota’s non-judicial foreclosure statute. The court only considered an idealized version of what is supposed to happen with MERS assignments, so this decision does not tell us what happens when the note is missing or the final assignment back to MERS is not properly completed. The court also considered a number of policy arguments raised by the homeowners, but in the absence of any compelling individual facts, the Court decided that the general policy concerns were not enough to change the outcome. One justice dissented, saying that every assignment of the loan should be recorded before MERS can foreclose.

The decision includes several points of interest. First, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute in 2004 that was specifically intended to allow a “nominee or agent” like MERS to record documents on behalf of lenders. The MERS recording statute did not directly control the requirements of the foreclosure statute, but the majority of the justices seemed to think it was important that the legislature had approved the MERS system.

Second, the decision was substantially based on the notion that MERS retained legal title and the right to foreclose the mortgage, even though the beneficial interest in the mortgage had been assigned when the note was assigned. This analysis pretty clearly requires a trust relationship between MERS and the lender (See Jackson Decision at 25). My strong impression (as an outsider) is that MERS is not set up to fulfill the fiduciary duties of a trustee, and has done everything in its power to avoid taking on fiduciary duties to lenders, borrowers or anyone else. This means the Jackson case, and others like it, may turn out to be something of a Pyrrhic victory for MERS once the litigation among the lenders and securitizers really gets going. This could be one more factor weighing against restarting Wall Street’s liar-loan securitization machine.

Finally, the homeowners argued that allowing MERS to cover up the chain of title was generally bad policy, and would prevent borrowers from seeking rescission or other remedies based on misrepresentation claims or federal truth in lending laws. The court declined to address these general policy concerns because that is the legislature’s job.

So what does it take for a homeowner to win a foreclosure case?

To win in the short run, the homeowner needs to show something wrong with the paperwork – an incomplete or untimely chain of assignments, a lost note, or a violation of whatever peculiar requirements may exist under the local foreclosure law. In order to win in the long run, the homeowner probably needs to be able to show some type of harm beyond the foreclosure itself. Bankruptcy cases are a little different, but in foreclosure cases the vast majority of judges simply aren’t going to start canceling mortgage debt without a very good reason. Here are some potential issues a homeowner might be able to raise to stop or seriously slow down a foreclosure:

Loss of claims and defenses. The Jackson court recognized that some homeowners might not be able to raise predatory lending claims and defenses because the person foreclosing on the loan was not the same person who made the loan. This is frequently true regardless of whether MERS is involved. Maybe in a future post we can talk about how lenders and securitizers deliberately use assignments to insulate themselves from liability for predatory lending claims. For now it is enough to note that a homeowner who was the victim of predatory lending will probably need to get a lawyer in order raise these issues during the foreclosure process. In fact, the foreclosure process does not necessarily give the borrower a chance to raise any claims or defenses at all. Notice that in both of the cases discussed today, the foreclosures were non-judicial and the homeowners had to file their own lawsuits in order to get a hearing on their claims. In addition, there may be numerous parties involved in the origination and handling of the loan, and the homeowner will need to use the local court rules to discover who those people were and what they have to say. But if a homeowner has plausible claims about predatory lending, a decent lawyer should be able to find a way to get those claims in front of a judge.

Loss of opportunity to negotiate. I don’t believe I’ve seen any cases on this specific issue yet, but if a homeowner can show that a non-responsive lender prevented the homeowner from getting a loan modification or from qualifying for an assistance program, that might be a good reason for a judge to stop the foreclosure proceeding. The judge might at least require the lender to disclose who can approve the modification before proceeding with the foreclosure. The judge may also have power to require the parties to negotiate in good faith in front of a mediator or another judge.

Double recovery. If there is a realistic chance the wrong person is getting the money from the foreclosure, a judge may stop the process until the right person is identified. If the investors were paid off by AIG through a credit default swap, for example, it may be an open question whether the pool trustee is entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. If legitimate questions along these lines can be raised, the case could get very complicated and go on for a very long time.

Fair Debt Collection Practices. Christopher Peterson, a law professor at the University of Utah, has raised the interesting issue of whether MERS should be treated as a debt collector under federal law. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act imposes a number of limitations on debt collection activities, and Professor Peterson argues that some of MERS’ methods are just the sort of deceptive practices that ought to be regulated under the Act. This might not be a defense against foreclosure, but it might improve the homeowner’s negotiating leverage quite a bit. A draft article by Professor Peterson is available here. The article contains a great deal of information, but it is a rough draft and contains some typos and incomplete footnote references.

Thursday, November 5, 2009

Mortgage Modifications ‘Insignificant’ to Credit Scores: VantageScore

Posted on the Housing Wire by Jon Prior:

Restructuring plans on a mortgage, whether in the form a forbearance, modification or short sale, have a relatively insignificant effect on the consumer’s credit score, said Sarah Davies, vice president of VantageScore, at the Loan Modifications Conference now underway in Dallas, Texas.

VantageScore measures the generic consumer’s credit score and his or her likelihood of slipping into 90-plus day delinquencies on a scale of 501 to 990. Three of the top 10 loan originators and eight of the top 25 financial institutions in the industry use VantageScore’s services.

If a servicer reduces a consumer’s original loan amount from 10-to-30%, the consumer’s credit score is only increased by three to 18 points, depending upon the consumer’s initial standing. Borrowers in the top-tier of credit scores, averaging an 862, receive only a three-point increase. Lower tier borrowers, in the 625 range, can receive an 18-point jump.

The credit score increases because the total amount of debt owed is reduced, and the borrower becomes more reliable – and risk deflates, Davies said.

However, foreclosure and bankruptcy can more severely affect the consumer’s credit score. If a borrower, who maintains good credit, is foreclosed, his or her credit score can decrease by as much as 140 points. Bankruptcy for someone in good credit standing results in a reduction of 365 points from the consumer’s credit and a mark on the file for seven to sometimes 10 years, Davies said.

“Delinquency on a mortgage account has a far greater negative impact to credit scores than loan modifications,” Davies said.

Loan modifications cause a small change in the score unless the lender establishes a new loan as part of the restructure. Credit scores take the biggest hits from short sales, foreclosures and bankruptcy, but if a consumer can bring delinquent accounts to a current status, his or her score can recover in as little as nine months, Davies said.

“When you can, let’s avoid bankruptcy,” Davies said.

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

It’s OK to Walk Away, A Law Professor Argues

Posted on the Wall Street Journal's Developments by James R. Hagerty:

Many Americans are enraged by the thought that some people are simply “walking away” from their homes—in other words, ceasing to make monthly loan payments and waiting for the lender to foreclose. How irresponsible! How unfair to those of us who do pay our bills!

Brent T. White, an associate professor of law at the University of Arizona, has a different perspective: “Homeowners should be walking away in droves,” he writes in a new discussion paper entitled “Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis.” (Read the full paper.)

A failure to grasp the true economics of the situation is holding back many Americans whose home values have dropped far below the amount they owe and who would be better off renting, Mr. White says. Fear, shame and guilt also are preventing rational decisions, he believes. And, he says, those “emotional constraints” are encouraged by politicians and bankers, who ruthlessly and amorally follow their own economic interests while telling Joe Soggy Homeowner he has a moral duty to pay his debt so long as he possibly can.

How many people decide to walk away or, in other words, default “strategically” rather than by necessity? Mr. White quotes research—a study by Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, “Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages”—as estimating that only about a fourth of homeowner defaults are “strategic.” The rest are due to such things as divorce, job losses or other financial calamities that prevent people from meeting payments.

“The real mystery is not—as media coverage has suggested—why large numbers of homeowners are walking away, but why, given the percentage of underwater mortgages, more homeowners are not,” the professor says.

Mr. White figures some people keep paying because they overestimate the difficulty of repairing the damage to their credit record that would be inflicted by a foreclosure. Some may be overly optimistic about the value of their homes or the potential for a near-term rebound in prices. Others, of course, may simply like their homes and not wish to move into rental housing.

At the same time, there is still a stigma that comes with failing to pay bills. “Nobody wants to be identified as a deadbeat,” Mr. White writes, and a high credit score can be seen as a sign of moral fiber.

The fear of trashing their credit scores helps prevent some people from making rational decisions, Mr. White believes. That plays into the interests of the banks or loan investors, who want as many homeowners as possible to keep sending in those checks.

The professor wants to “level the playing field” between bank and borrower. How? One way, Mr. White says, would be to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to bar lenders from reporting mortgage defaults to credit bureaus. With that threat removed, he says, homeowners would have more leverage with banks and so would be more likely to work out a deal, such as a reduction in the principal due on homes whose value has plunged far below the loan amount. The bank and the borrower both screwed up in making a bad bet on real estate; now they could share the pain.

“It is time to put to rest the assumption that a borrower who exercises the option to default is somehow immoral or irresponsible,” Mr. White writes.

So is Mr. White walking? No, he says. He believes he is “just barely” under water on his house in Tucson, 3% to 5%. That’s “not enough that walking would make sense,” he says. Still, with refreshing modesty, he adds: “I can’t claim to be free from emotional and cognitive biases.”

Refinancing in Q309 Saves Borrowers $3bn in 12 Months: Freddie

Posted on the Housing Wire by Diana Golobay:

Half of all borrowers that refinanced their conventional loans in Q309 saw their annual mortgage interest rate drop by at least 17%, according to a quarterly report by mortgage giant Freddie Mac (FRE: 1.13 -1.74%).

Although the new interest rate was only about 1.1 percentage points below the old rate, in aggregate the interest rate reduction adds up to around $3bn in savings for these borrowers over the first 12 months of the new loan, according to a survey of a sample of properties on which Feddie funded at least two successive loans.

During the first nine months of the year, 30-year fixed mortgage interest rates averaged 5.1%, the lowest average over that time frame ever recorded in 38 years of Freddie’s mortgage rate survey, according to vice president and chief economist Frank Nothaft.

Cumulative refinance volumes at Fannie and Freddie, through September. (source: FHFA)

“At the beginning of the year, only borrowers who still had a solid equity cushion could take advantage of the low mortgage rates, but through the Homeownership Affordability Refinance Program (HARP) that got underway in April, borrowers who have a loan owned by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae can refinance that loan even if they have no home equity,” Nothaft said, adding the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) indicates that as of August 31, more than 93,000 borrowers refinanced under these terms.

FHFA in July announced the extension of HARP to borrowers with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios up to 125%, effectively broadening the reach of refinance to deeply underwater borrowers.

Of prime borrowers that refinanced a conventional, first-lien mortgage, 64% (the highest share in 6 years) either kept the same principal balance or reduced it, according to Freddie. Cash-out refinancing, where the new loan amount through comes in at least 5% higher than the paid-off first-lien mortgage balance, slipped to a six-year low of 36% in the quarter. Through Q309, borrowers cashed out a total $60bn in 2009.

“Adjusting for inflation, this was the smallest volume of equity extraction over the first three quarters of a year since 2000,” said deputy chief economist Amy Crews Cutts. “The principle cause of the decline in cash-out refinance is that homeowners have a smaller equity cushion. The median property refinanced in the third quarter had no net appreciation over the time since the previous mortgage was taken out, which was three and a half years ago.”

Freddie, together with sister government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) Fannie Mae (FNM: 1.00 -2.91%), refinanced more than 3.5m mortgage loans in 2009 as of September, according to the GSEs’ conservator, the FHFA. The GSEs refinanced 262,000 mortgages in September alone — a slight drop from August as mortgage rates are edging higher than in spring.

Foreclosures and the unemployment rate maps

Posted on the Sober Look:

This may be "intuitively obvious", but it's worth looking at these two maps next to each other.

Map of home foreclosures:


source: realtytrac


Map of the unemployment rate by state:


source: the Fed